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Experienced ease of recall was found to qualify the implications of recalled content. Ss who had to 
recall 12 examples o f assertive (unassertive) behaviors, which was difficult, rated themselves as less 
assertive (less unassertive) than subjects who had to recall 6 examples, which was easy In Fact, Ss 
reported higher assertiveness after recalling 12 unassertive rather than 12 assertive behaviors. Thus, 
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ease of recall was eliminated when its informational value was discredited by a misattribution 
manipulation. The informative functions of subjective experiences are discussed.
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O ne o f  the m ost widely shared assu mptions in decision mak­
ing as well as in social judgment research holds that people 
estim ate the frequency o f an event, or the likeli hood o rits occur­
rence, “by the ease with which instances o r associations come to 
m ind” (Tversky & Kahnem an, 1973, p. 208). Since Tversky and 
K ahnem an introduced this availability heuristic, it has stimu­
lated a trem endous am ount o f research in social cognition (see 
Sherm an & Corty, 1984; Strack, 1985, for reviews). However, the 
classic studies on the issue are surprisingly ambiguous regard­
ing the underlying process. For example, in the most frequently 
cited study (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, Experiment 8), sub­
jects were read two lists o f  names, one presenting 19 famous 
m en and 20 less famous women and the other presenting 19 
famous women and 20 less famous men. W hen asked, subjects 
reported that there were more men than women in the first list 
but more women than men in the second list, even though the 
opposite was true (by a difference o f  1). Presumably, the famous 
nam es were easier to recall than the nonfamous ones, resulting 
in an overestimate. In fact, subjects were able to  recall about 
50% more o f  the famous than o f  the nonfamous names. It re­
mains unclear, however, what drives the overestimate: Were 
subjects’ judgm ents based on the phenom enal experience of 
the ease or difficulty with which they could bring the famous
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and nonfamous names to mind, as Tversky and Kahneman’s 
interpretation suggests? Or were their judgments based on the 
content o f their recall, with famous nam es being overrepre­
sented in the recalled sample?
In a related study (Tversky & Kahnem an, 1973, Experiment 
3), subjects were found to overestimate the number o f  words 
that began with the letter r  but lo underestimate the number o f  
words that had r as the third letter. Similarly, Gabrielcik and 
Fazio (1984) observed that exposing subjects to subliminally 
presented words containing the letter t increased subjects’ esti­
mates o f  the frequency o f / words. Again, these findings may 
reflect either that subjects could generate more words begin­
ning with an r, o r including a / i f  prim ed or that they relied on 
the ease with which relevant exemplars could be called lo mind. 
Similar ambiguities apply to other studies (see Sherman & 
Corty, 1984; Strack, 1985; Taylor, 1982, for reviews). Typically, 
the manipulations that are introduced to increase the subjec­
tively experienced ease of recall are also likely to  affect the 
am ount o f subjects’ recall. As a result, it is difficult to evaluate if  
the obtained estimates o f frequency, likelihood, or typicality 
are based on subjects’ subjective experiences or on a biased 
sample o f  recalled information. As Taylor (1982) noted, the 
latter possibility would render the availability heuristic rather 
trivial—after all, “one’s judgments are always based on what 
comes to mind” (p. 199).
In the present article, we report three studies that were de­
signed to disentangle the impact o f  content o f recall and o f the 
subjective experience o f ease or difficulty that may accompany 
recall. In all studies, we introduced conditions under which the 
implications o f experienced ease o f  recall were opposite to the 
implications o f the content o f recall per se. In addition, we 
manipulated the perceived diagnosticity o f the experienced 
ease o f recall, using misattribution manipulations (Experiment 
3). We first introduce the basic logic and the findings o f our 
experiments and subsequently discuss the informational func­
tions o f experienced ease o f recall in the context o f a more 
general conceptualization o f  the informational functions of 
subjective experiences (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988).
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E x p erim en t 1: I f  It Is So D ifficult to  Recall,
It C a n n o t Be Typical
Suppose that people are asked to report a certain number of 
examples o f particularly assertive, or o f  particularly unasser­
tive, behaviors that they have recently engaged in. Presumably, 
reporting these behaviors would increase their cognitive accessi­
bility in memory, m aking it more likely that these behaviors 
come to mind when the people are later asked to evaluate their 
own assertiveness. As a result, one should find that people who 
had to report assertive behaviors report higher assertiveness 
than people who had to report unassertive behaviors, reflecting 
that the previously reported examples resulted in a biased sam­
ple o f relevant behaviors. As long as people consider only the 
content of what they recall, the more examples they have to 
report, the more pronounced this effect should be. Such con- 
tent-based predictions may be derived from numerous models 
o f  self-related judgm ent (e.gn Bern, 1972; Wyer & Srull, 1989).
Suppose, however, that people not only rely on what comes to 
mind but also pay attention to the subjective experiences that 
accompany the recall process. If so, the subjective experience 
that it is very difficult to recall examples o f  one’s own assertive 
behaviors may imply that one cannot be that assertive after all, 
or thinking o f examples would not be that difficult To the 
extent that the experienced difficulty o f recall increases with 
the number o f examples that arc to be reported, ease o f recall 
and content o f recall would lead to different conclusions: 
Whereas the content o f  the recalled examples would suggest 
that one is very assertive (or very unassertive), the difficulty 
experienced in recalling these examples would suggest that 
they cannot be frequent and typical. Hence, one may conclude 
that one is probably not as assertive (or unassertive) as the re­
called behaviors would seem to imply. Accordingly the experi­
enced difficulty o f  recall may qualify the implications o f re­
called content.
In Experim ent!, we tested this prediction by asking subjects 
to describe either 6 o r 12 examples o f very assertive or very 
unassertive behaviors in which they had engaged. Pretests indi­
cated that most subjects could easily generate 8 o r 9 behaviors 
but found it very difficult to generate more than 10. Subse­
quently, subjects were asked to rate their own assertiveness 
along several items.
If subjects base assessments o f their own assertiveness solely 
on the relevant behavior that comes to m ind, subjects who have 
to  report examples o f assertive behavior should rate themselves 
as more assertive than subjects who have to report examples of 
unassertive behavior. Moreover, the more examples subjects 
have to report, the more pronounced the impact o f recalled 
content should be. Thus, a content-based judgm ent proccss will 
predict additive effects o f  type of example and number of exam­
ples requested. I f  subjects consider the content o f their recall in 
the light o f the ease or difficulty with which they can generate 
the requested examples, however, these additive effects should 
not be obtained. Rather, the impact o f recalled content should 
be less pronounced, the more examples subjects have to report 
because the difficulty o f  doing so should imply that the recalled 
examples are not very frequent and typical. Hence, subjects 
should rate themselves as less assertive (or unassertive) after 
recalling 12 rather than 6 examples, indicating that the implica­
tions o f recalled content are qualified by the ease or difficulty 
with which this content could be brought to m ind.
Method
Forty female students at a German university participated in a 2 
(examples of assertive vs. unassertive behaviors) X 2 (6 vs. 12 examples) 
factorial between-subjects experiment. Subjects were randomly as­
signed to conditions and tested in groups of 4.
All subjects were informed that the study was concerned with devel­
oping role-playing scenarios that could be used in future relaxation 
training. To help with the development of these scenarios, they were 
asked to describe either 6 or 12 examples of situations in which they 
“behaved very assertively and felt at ease” or of situations in which they 
“behaved unassertively and felt insecure.” Pretests indicated that gen­
erating 6 examples was experienced as an easy task, whereas generating 
12 examples was difficult. Subjects reported their examples on answer 
sheets that provided three lines for each example.
After completion of this task, subjects were asked to answer some 
general questions, purportedly designed to explore students’ interest in 
participating in a relaxation-training program. These questions asked 
subjects to evaluate their assertiveness, their feelings of insecurity and 
their feelings of anxiety along 10-point scales. Given the high internal 
consistency of these ratings (Cronbach’s alpha = .76), the mean of these 
ratings was used as the major dependent variable; higher values indi­
cated higher assertiveness.
In addition, subjects rated how difficult it was to generate the re­
quested number of examples on a scale ranging from not ai ail difficult 
(1) to very difficult ( 10), thus providing a direct measure of experienced 
ease of recall.
Results
Manipulation check. Analyses o f subjects’ reported ease o f  
retrieval indicated that subjects found it easier to  report 6 (M =
5.1) rather than 12 (Af = 7.2) examples, F 0 , 36) = 4.2, p  < .05. 
No other effect emerged (F < 1 ).
Mean differences. As shown in Table I, subjects who had to  
describe examples o f  assertive behaviors rated themselves as 
more assertive after describing 6 (M = 6.3) rather than  12 (A /=
5.2) examples. Conversely, subjects who had to describe exam­
ples o f unassertive behaviors rated themselves as less assertive 
after describing 6 {M= 5.2) rather than 12 (M  = 6.2) examples. 
This crossover pattern was reflected in a marginally significant 
Valence X Number o f Examples Requested interaction, J*X1, 
36) = 3.40, p  <  .07', whereas neither o f the m ain effects reached 
significance (F <  l) .1
These findings indicate that subjects did consider the experi­
enced ease o f recall in evaluating their own assertiveness. In 
fact, subjects rated themselves as more assertive after describing 
examples o f  assertive rather than unassertive behaviors only i f  
the recall task was easy W hen the recall task was difficult, their 
self-rating was opposite to the implications o f  recalled content, 
despite the fact that more examples had been recalled. This 
pattern o f findings could not be accounted for on the basis o f  
recalled content per se.2 Rather, it reflected that the implica­
tions o f recalled content were qualified by the ease with which 
the respective content could be brought to mind.
1 The statistical weakness of this interaction is of little concern be­
cause this pattern replicates consistently in subsequent experiments.
2 h was conceivable, however, that the representativeness of the re­
called examples decreased with increasing number of examples re­
quested. This issue was addressed in Experiment 2, which ruled out 
this possibility as described below.
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Table 1
Ratings o f  Assertiveness as a Function o f  Valence and  
plumber o f  Recalled Behaviors
Type of behavior
No. recalled examples Assertive Unassertive
6 6.3 5.2
12 5.2 6.2
Sole, n = 9 or 10 per condition. Mean score of three questions is given; 
possible range is I to 10; higher values reflect higher assertiveness.
Correlational analyses. This conclusion is farther supported 
by correlational analyses. Specifically, the more difficult sub­
jects who had to recall assertive behaviors found the recall task, 
the lower the assertiveness they reported, r{20) = —.35, p  = . 12. 
In contrast, the more difficult subjects who had to report exam­
ples o f unassertive behaviors found the task, the higher the 
assertiveness they reported, r(20) = .66, p  < .002. Both correla­
tions differ reliably from one another (z = 3.38, p <  .001).
Discussion
In summary; the present findings suggest that the content o f 
recall affccted self-judgments in the direction o f the valence o f 
the recalled behaviors only if  the recall process itself was experi­
enced as easy If  the recall process elicited experiences o f diffi­
culty, on the other hand, the content o f recall affected self-judg­
ments in a direction opposite to the implications o f  the recalled 
behaviors. Hence, we may conclude that the phenom enal expe­
rience o f  ease o r difficulty o f recall may qualify the implications 
o f what comes to mind, even to the extent that the inferences 
drawn are opposite in valence to the implications o f  recalled 
content.
Experiment 2: An Extended Replication
Given the m arginal significance o f  the interaction obtained 
in Experiment 1, a replication o f  this finding would be wel­
come. Experiment 2 was designed to provide this replication 
and extended the previous study by m anipulating the perceived 
diagnosticity o f  experienced ease o f  retrieval. Subjects were 
again asked to report 6 or 12 examples o f assertive or unasser­
tive behavior. However, some subjects were informed that most 
participants o f  a previous study had found it easy to complete 
this task, whereas other subjects were told that most previous 
participants found the task difficult. We expected that subjects 
who were told that their subjective experience o f ease or diffi­
culty o f  recall was shared by most other subjects would be likely 
to attribute their experience to characteristics o f  the task. If  so, 
they might perceive their subjective experience o f  ease or diffi­
culty as being less diagnostic and might therefore be less likely 
to consider it when making a self-judgment (cf. Kelley, 1967). In 
contrast, subjects who were told that their own experience of 
ease or difficulty contradicted the typical experience o f  similar 
others might be more likely to perceive their apparently unique 
phenom enal experience as reflecting the frequency o f the re­
spective behaviors in their own repertoire. If so, they would be 
more likely to  rely on their subjective experience o f ease or 
difficulty o f retrieval in making self-judgments.
Method
One hundred fifty-eight students (113 women and 45 men) of a West 
German teachers' college were asked to report either 6 or 12 examples 
of assertive or unassertive behavior and were informed either that most 
previous participants had found it easy or that most previous partici­
pants had found it difficult to complete this task. The latter manipula­
tion should increase the perceived diagnosticity of ease or difficulty of 
retrieval under conditions in which subjects* own experience deviates 
from the alleged experience of previous participants, that is, in which 
subjects find the task easy (6 examples) but are told others found it 
difficult or in which subjects find the task difficult (12 examples) but 
are told others found it easy Conversely this information should de­
crease perceived diagnosticity under conditions in which subjects’ ex­
perience coincides with the alleged experience o f most other partici­
pants.
In combination, these manipulations constituted a 2 (examples of 
assertive vs. unassertive behaviors) X 2 (6 vs. 12 examples) X 2 (low vs. 
high diagnosticity of ease of recall) factorial between-subjects design. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to conditions, and all subjects were 
tested in one session in a lecture hall setting.
The cover story and procedure used closely followed the procedure 
described in Experiment I, except that the study was said to be con­
cerned with the development of assertiveness (rather than relaxation) 
training. After completing the requested number of examples, subjects 
responded to a short questionnaire that purportedly assessed students' 
interest in participating in assertiveness training. Specifically, subjects 
rated their own assertiveness, their desire to be more assertive, and 
their interest in assertiveness training along 9-point bipolar scales. The 
mean score of these variables (Cronbach’s alpha = .72) was used as the 
dependent variable; high values indicated high assertiveness.
Results
Manipulation check. Analysis o f variance again indicated 
that subjects experienced recalling 6 examples as easier (M  = 
4.8) than recalling 12 examples [M  = 7.4), _F(lt 142) = 5.2, p  < 
.02. No other effect reached significance.
Mean differences. Analyses o f variance including subjects’ 
sex revealed a m ain effect o f sex, F (l, 142) =  7.15, /? <  .01, 
indicating that men reported higher assertiveness than did 
women. However, sex o f subjects did not interact with any of 
the experimental variables (all F < 1 ) and was therefore ignored 
in the following analyses.
As shown in Table 2, the present study replicated the pre­
vious findings. Specifically, subjects who had to describe exam­
ples o f assertive behaviors rated themselves as more asser-
Table 2
Ratings o f  Assertiveness as a Function o f  Valence and Number 
o f Recalled Behaviors and Others' Ease o f  Recall
Diagnosticity of ease of recall
Low High
No. recalled
examples Assert Unasscrt Assert Unassert
6 5.1 5.0 5.2 4.5
12 4.7 5.2 4.7 5.4
Note. n= 13 to 20 per condition. Mean score of five questions is given; 
possible range is 1 to 9; higher values reflea higher assertiveness. As­
sert = assertive; Unas sert = unassertive.
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tivc after describing 6 examples (M -  5.2) rather than 12 exam­
ples (M  = 4.7). Conversely, subjects who had to describe exam­
ples o f unassertive behavior rated themselves as less assertive 
after describing 6 examples (M = 4.7) rather than 12 examples 
(M  = 3.3). This crossover pattern was reflected in a significant 
Valence X Number of Examples Requested interaction, F(l, 
142) = 6.35, p < .02. As in Experiment 1, no main effects o f 
valence or num ber o f  examples emerged (F < 1).
Contrary to predictions, however, the manipulation of the 
perceived diagnosticity o f the experienced ease o f  recall had no 
significant impact on subjects’ self-assessment Although sepa­
rate analyses revealed a significant Valence X Number of Exam­
ples interaction under high-diagnosticity conditions, F(1,76) = 
5.98, p  < .03, but not under low-diagnoslicity conditions {F < 
I), the triple interaction failed to reach significance {F< 1). We 
return to this issue below.
Correlational analyses. The interpretation that subjects’ self- 
assessments o f assertiveness were mediated by the subjective 
experience o f ease o f retrieval is again supported by correla­
tional analyses. Specifically, subjects who had to report exam­
ples o f unassertive behavior reported higher assertiveness the 
more difficult they found the task(r= .32, p <  .002). In contrast, 
subjects who had to report examples of assertive behavior re­
ported lower assertiveness the more difficult they found the 
task (r = - .  12, p = .  15), and both correlations differ significantly 
from one another (z  = 2.77, p  < .003).
Self-perception. A possible alternative account o f the ob­
tained findings of this and the previous experiment required 
additional analyses. To the extent that recalling many examples 
is difficult, the more examples subjects are to report, the more 
the representativeness o f the recalled examples may decrease. 
Thus, subjects who have to recall 12 examples may eventually 
include examples that are less extreme to complete their task. If 
so, a content-based judgmental process may produce a similar 
pattern of findings, reflecting that the inclusion o f less extreme 
examples may dilute the impact of more extreme ones (cf. Nis- 
bctt, Zukier, & Lem ley, 1981).
To lest this possibility, the extremity o f  the last two examples 
provided by 5 randomly selected subjects from each condition 
o f  Experiment 2 was rated by two independent judges on a scale 
ranging from very unassertive (1) to very assertive (\ I). Interrater 
reliability was high (r -  .92), and examples of assertive behav­
io r  (M  = 9.6) differed reliably from examples o f unassertive 
behaviors (M  = 2.8), F{1, 32) =  663.0, p < .001. More impor­
tant, planned com parisons indicated that the last 2 examples 
provided by subjects who had to report 12 examples were, if 
anything, better exemplars of the requested type of behavior 
than the last 2 examples provided by subjects who had to recall 
only 6 examples: (Ms = 9 .8  and 9.4), F  < 1, for 12 and 6 assertive 
behaviors, respectively; (Ms = 2.3 and 3.3), F (l, 32) = 4.26, p  < 
.05, for 12 and 6 unassertive behaviors, respectively
Thus, although differences in the quality of the recalled be­
haviors did emerge in the unassertive examples conditions, 
these differences were opposite to those found in subjects’ judg­
ments, lending no support to  the hypothesis that subjects' judg­
ments were mediated by differential content rather than by the 
subjective experience of ease o f  recall.
Discussion
In summary. Experiment 2 replicated the previously ob­
tained interaction, indicating that the implications o f recalled
content were qualified by the case with which this content could 
be brought to mind. In contrast to our expectations, however, 
informing subjects that most previous participants found the 
task easy or difficult, respectively, did not result in a significant 
triple interaction, although separate analyses under each diag- 
noslicily condition provided some support for our reasoning. 
In retrospect, the standard that we introduced might have been 
less relevant for subjects’ self-judgments than we had assum ed a 
priori: W hereas the diagnosticity manipulation referred to 
others’ experience, the requested judgment was not a com para­
tive one. Individuals may use their own feelings and aspirations, 
rather than the behavior o f  others, in evaluating how assertive 
they are. I f  they can easily recall situations in which they be­
haved unassertively, for example, this may be bothersom e no 
m atter if  others can do so just as easily or not. Moreover, in ­
forming subjects about others’ experienced ease or difficulty o f 
recall may have focused their attention even more on their own 
phenom enal experience, thus increasing its impact. Accord­
ingly a different manipulation o f  the diagnosticity o f  ease o f  
retrieval is used in Experiment 3.
At the same time, the failure to obtain a pronounced im pact 
o f the alleged typical recall performance renders a possible 
variation o f  the ease-of-recall account less plausible. Specifi­
cally one might argue that asking subjects to report 12 examples 
of a given class o f  behaviors may convey that most people are 
probably able to  do so. I f  so, the experienced difficulty in meet­
ing this expectation might imply that one has less o f the respec­
tive trait than many other people. Accordingly, the obtained 
findings would reflect the experience o f ease or difficulty in  
meeting a certain standard, rather than the experience o f ease 
or difficulty o f recall per se. If so, however, one would expect a 
pronounced impact o f explicit information about the ease or 
difficulty with which others can perform the recall task. T hat 
this manipulation showed little effect renders an ease-of-meet- 
ing-a-standard account less compelling.
Experiment 3: Misattributing the Ease of Recall
Reflecting the assumption that others’ perform ance may not 
be germane to the inform ational value o f subjective experi­
ences, as discussed above, a  different m anipulation o f  perceived 
diagnosticity o f ease o f retrieval was used in Experim ent 3. As 
previous research on the informational functions o f  another 
subjective experience— namely mood—indicated, the diagnos­
ticity o f subjective states can be manipulated by m isattribution 
manipulations. For example, attributing one’s feelings correctly 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983, Experiment I) o r incorrectly (Schwarz 
& Clore, 1983, Experiment 2; Schwarz, Servay, & Kumpf, 1985) 
to a transient source that is irrelevant to the judgm ent at hand 
was found to  eliminate the im pact o f affective states on subse­
quent judgments (see Schwarz, 1987, 1990; Schwarz & Clore,
1988, for reviews). Similarly, misattributing one’s arousal to an 
irrelevant source (eg, Zanna & Cooper, 1974; Zillm an & 
Bryant, 1974) was found to eliminate the effects o f  arousal 
states (see Zanna & Cooper, 1976; Zillman, 1978, for reviews).
Following these lines o f research, we introduced a m isattri­
bution m anipulation in Experiment 3. Specifically we in­
formed subjects that the study was concerned with the impact 
o f different types o f music on the recall o f  autobiographical 
experiences. All subjects were exposed, by means o f  head-
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phones, to a piecc o f meditation music. Some subjects were 
inform td that this music facilitated the recall o f situations in 
which one behaved assertively and felt at ease, whereas others 
were inform ed that it facilitated the recall o f  situations in which 
one behaved unassertively and felt insecure. After these in­
structions, subjects had to describe either 6 or 12 examples of 
assertr-t o r unassertive behaviors, replicating the previous ex­
perim ents.
Following Kelley’s (1972) reasoning about augmentation and 
discounting effects, we expected the alleged side effects o f  expo­
sure t o  meditation music to moderate the impact o f  subjects’ 
experienced ease o f  recall on their self-assessment o f  assertive­
ness. N o st im portant, subjects whose subjective experience 
contradicted the alleged side effect o f the music would consider 
this experience particularly diagnostic and would use it in their 
self-assessment. Accordingly their self-rating would only re­
flect the content o f  recall if  recall was easy, and not if  it was 
difficuli, replicating the previously obtained findings.
Predictions are somewhat more complex, however, for sub­
jects who can attribute their subjective experience to the music, 
thus rendering it nondiagnostic. On the one hand, these sub­
jects may turn  to the content o f their recall to  evaluate their 
assertiveness, given that the informational value o f their subjec­
tive experience has been discredited. I f  so, they should report 
h igher assertiveness after recalling 12 rather than 6 examples of 
assertive behaviors and lower assertiveness after recalling 12 
rather than 6 examples o f unassertive behaviors, despite the 
difficulty that they experienced in doing so. Thus, within each 
valence condition, discrediting the informative value o f experi­
enced ease or difficulty o f  recall should result in a data pattern 
that is opposite to the pattern observed in the previous experi­
ments.
On the other hand, discrediting the informational value of 
experienced ease o f retrieval may lead to self-assessments that 
are opposite to the implications o f  recalled content under some 
conditions. Much as self-assessments were found to deviate 
from the content o f  recall when recall was difficult, they may be 
expected to deviate from the content o f  recall if  recall is easy, 
but for the wrong reasons. Specifically, subjects who can easily 
recall 6 examplesofassertive (or unassertive) behavior but attrib­
ute the  experienced ease to the alleged im pact o f the music may 
discount their subjective experience. This may render the typi­
cality and frequency o f the recalled behaviors dubious, resulting 
in lower ratings o f assertiveness (or unassertiveness, respec­
tively). If so, subjects who had to report 6 examples o f assertive 
behavior may actually rate themselves as less assertive than sub­
jects who had to recall 6 examples o f unassertive behaviors 
under these conditions. A sim ilar prediction cannot be derived, 
however, for subjects who have to recall 12 examples under 
low-diagnosticity conditions. In this case, the misattribution 
m anipulation implies that the impact o f  the music may render 
recall difficult, suggesting that the content o f  recall is informa­
tive despite the experienced difficulty. Accordingly, these sub­
jects’ self-ratings should reflect content, and no reversal be­
tween valence conditions should be obtained.
In sum m ary  discrediting the informative value o f  experi­
enced ease o f  recall may result in a data pattern that is opposite 
to the pattern observed in the previous experiments, either 
within or between the valence conditions, whereas the previ­
ously obtained pattern should replicate when the informational
value ofsubjects’ phenomenal experience is not called into ques­
tion.
Method
Seventy-eight female students of a West German university partici­
pated in a 2 (examples of assertive vs. unassertive behaviors) x 2 (6 vs. 
12 examples) X 2 (high vs. low diagnosticity of experienced ease of 
recall) factorial between-subjects experiment. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to conditions and received all instructions from cassette 
players by means of headphones.
Subjects were told that the study was part of a research program 
concerned with the impact of music on the recall of autobiographical 
memories of different emotional valence. The present study was said to 
investigate the recall of a specific type of situation, namely situations 
in which one felt insecure or felt assertive and at case, respectively. 
Accordingly, subjects were asked to describe either 6 or 12 examples o f 
situations in which they “behaved assertively and feh at ease” or of 
situations in which they “behaved unassertively and felt insecure” while 
listening to meditation music, presented by means of headphones.
To manipulate the perceived diagnosticity of experienced ease of 
recall, subjects were told that the music was known to facilitate the 
recall of autobiographical memories that pertain to experiences char­
acterized by assertiveness or by insecurity, respectively. If the music is 
said to facilitate the respective recall task, this alleged side effect 
should result in low diagnosticity of the experienced ease of retrieval 
associated with recalling 6 examples but high diagnosticity of the diffi­
culty associated with recalling 12 examples. Conversely, if the music is 
said to facilitate recall of experiences that are opposite in valence to 
those the person is asked to recall, this should imply high diagnosticity 
of easy recall but low diagnosticity of difficult recall.
To draw attention to the alleged impact of the music, subjects were 
exposed to the music for 30 s and were asked to rate the music along 
several items before they began to work on the recall task. In addition, 
it was emphasized that the music might only develop its impact after a 
certain amount of exposure, and subjects were told that the time of 
exposure was varied in the present study. This information seemed 
necessary because the subjective experience of difficulty of recall does 
only emerge after a certain number of examples are reported. To draw 
attention to this information, subjects received a note that said the 
following:
You will be exposed to the music 
( ) for the first four minutes,
( ) for the first eight minutes,
( ) for the full duration of the recall task.
For all subjects, the full duration option was checked by the experi­
menter.
Following this information, subjects provided descriptions of the 
requested behavioral examples while listening to the music. Subse­
quently, they rated their own assertiveness, as well their desire to be 
more assertive, along 9-point scales. The mean score of these ratings 
was used as the major dependent variable, with higher values indicat­
ing higher assertiveness. In addition, a rating of the experienced ease of 
retrieval was obtained on a scale ranging from easy (1) to difficuli (9).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. As in the previous studies, subjects re­
ported that recalling 6 examples (M  = 5.9) was easier than recal­
ling 12 examples (M  -  6.7), although this difference did not 
reach significance, /"(1,70) = 1.76, ns. No other effects emerged.
Mean differences. Subjects’ self-ratings o f assertiveness are
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Table 3
Ratings o f  Assertiveness as a Function o f  Valence, Number o f  
Recalled Behaviors, and  Diagnosticity o f  Ease o f Recall
Diagnosticity of ease of recall
No. recalled
Low High
examples Assert Unassert Assert Unassert
6 3.9 5.1 5.6 3.1
12 4.8 4.0 4.5 4.4
Note, ft is 9 or 10 per condition. Mean score of two questions is given; 
possible range is 1 to 9; higher values reflect higher assertiveness. As­
sert = assertive; Unassert = unassertive.
shown in Table 3, as a function of the experimental variables. 
Analysis o f  variance again indicated a significant Valence X 
Number o f  Examples Requested interaction, F (l, 70) = 4.09, 
p < .04. However, this interaction was qualified by a significant 
triple interaction, F(l,  70) = 9.75, p  <  .001, involving level o f 
diagnosticity o f experienced ease o f retrieval.
Diagnoses o f this triple interaction revealed that the previ­
ously obtained Valence X Number of Examples Requested in­
teraction was restricted to  conditions in which the alleged side 
effects o f the music d id  not discredit the diagnosticity o f  experi­
enced ease o r difficulty o f retrieval, / ( I ,  70) = 5.97, p < .02, for 
the simple interaction under high diagnosticity. Specifically, 
subjects who had to recall assertive behaviors reported higher 
assertiveness after describing 6 examples (Af = 5.6) rather than 
12 examples {M  =  4.5), /(70) = 1.55, p  < .06, one-tailed. Con­
versely, subjects who had to  recall unassertive behaviors rated 
themselves as less assertive after describing 6 examples {M =
3.1) rather than 12 examples {M = 4.4), r(70) = 1.91, p <  .03, 
one-tailed. This pattern replicates the key findings o f  Experi­
ments 1 and 2, further illustrating the robustness o f the effect, 
although no crossover was obtained in the present study.
This was not so, however, under low-diagnosticity condi­
tions, in which the alleged side effects of the music rendered the 
experienced ease or difficulty o f retrieval uninformative. In that 
case, com parisons within each valence condition suggest that 
subjects tended to  rely on the content o f  recall, rather than on 
the ease with which that content came to mind. Specifically 
subjects who had to  report examples o f assertive behaviors re­
ported higher assertiveness after recalling 12 (A/= 4.8) rather 
than 6 (Af  = 3.9) examples, /(70) = 1.27, p  <  .10, one-tailed. 
Similarly, subjects who had to recall examples o f  unassertive 
behaviors reported being less assertive after recalling 12 (M  = 
4.0) rather than 6 (A/ = 5 .11) examples, t{10) = 1.52, p < .06, 
one-tailed. This im pact o f  content o f recall is reflected in a 
simple interaction that is opposite in direction to  the one ob­
tained under high diagnosticity conditions, /XI, 70) = 3.88, 
p  < .06.
At the same lime, diagnosis o f this simple interaction by com­
parisons between both valence conditions indicates that sub­
jects who had to recall 6 examples o f assertive behaviors rated 
themselves as less assertive (M  = 3.9) than subjects who had to 
recall 6 examples o f  unassertive behaviors (M  = 5 .1 ), i(70) = 
1.59, p  <  .06, one-tailed. This suggests that subjects discounted
the experienced ease o f retrieval, resulting in a reversal between 
both valence conditions. Finally, such a reversal was not ob­
tained when subjects had to recall 12 examples {M= 4.8 and 4.0 
for assertive and unassertive examples, respectively), as sug­
gested by the reasoning outlined in the introduction to this 
study.
In summary, the previously obtained Valenre X Number o f  
Examples interaction only emerged when the informational 
value o f subjects’ subjective experience o f  ease or difficulty o f  
recall was not discredited. W hen the alleged side effects o f the 
music did discredit the implications o f subjects' subjective expe­
rience, subjects did not rely on their subjective experience. 
Rather, subjects who had to recall 6 examples ofassertive behav­
iors reported lower assertiveness than subjects w ho had to  recall 
6 examples o f unassertive behavior, presumably reflecting that 
they discounted the experienced case o f retrieval. This latter 
finding renders com parisons within each vaience condition 
under low diagnosticity somewhat am biguou. .vhich would 
otherwise suggest that subjects in  the low diagnosticity condi­
tions relied primarily on the content o f recall, as inflected in the 
more pronounced impact o f  recalling 12 rather than 6 exam­
ples.
Correlational analyses. As in the previous experiments, sub­
jects who had to recall examples o f  unassertive behaviors re­
ported higher assertiveness the more difficult iney found the 
recall task (r = .23, p  = .  15), provided that the diagnosticity of 
ease o f recall was not called into question. W hen the diagnosti­
city o f  ease o f  recall was discredited, on  the other hand, both 
variables were uncorrelated (r=  .05), as would be expccted on 
the basis o f  the present theorizing, although he difference be­
tween correlations did not reach significance (•’ = .60). Finally, 
no significant correlation o f  reported ease o f  recall and asser­
tiveness emerged under either high (r =  .03) u.> low (r =  —.02) 
diagnosticity conditions for subjects who had to  report exam­
ples o f  assertive behavior, in  contrast to  the previous experi­
ments. Subjects might have taken the induced expectations into 
account in making their ratings, thus obscuring the correla­
tional relationships obtained in  the previous experiments.
General Discussion 
Ease o f Recall as Information
In combination, the reported findings provide consistent 
support for the assumption that the implications o f  recalled 
content may be qualified by the ease or difficulty with which 
that content can be brought to m ind. Although this assumption 
has enjoyed great popularity since Tversky and Kahnem an’s 
(1973) introduction o f  the availability heuristic, it had not been 
adequately tested in previous studies. M ost im portant, these 
studies were open to the alternative interpretation that m anipu­
lations that affected the ease o f  recall could ju s t as well affect 
the content o f recall. Accordingly the obtained findings could 
either be attributed to  biased recall, reflecting what has been 
called the accessibility bias (cf. Iyengar, 1990) or lo the accom­
panying subjective experience o f greater ease o f retrieval, re­
flecting the operation of the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973), as Taylor (1982) noted.
By constructing conditions under which the implications of
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w hat vas recalled contradicted the implications o f the subjec­
tively experienced ease or difficulty with which it came to 
m ind , we could disentangle the impact o f both sources o f infor­
m ation. In three experiments, subjects attributed themselves 
higher assertiveness after recalling 6 rather than 12 examples of 
assertive behavior and lower assertiveness after recalling 6 
rather than  12 examples o f unassertive behavior. If their judg­
m e n t was solely based on the content o f  what they recalled, 
th e ir  self-attributions should have been more extreme the more 
examples they recalled—in particular because content analyses 
o f  th e  reported examples (presented as part o f Experiment 2) 
provided no evidence that the larger number o f examples re­
quested decreased their representativeness. Accordingly a 
judgm ental process that is based on recalled content as the only 
source o f  information cannot account for the observed results.
Rather, the present findings indicate that people paid atten­
tion to the subjective experience o f ease or difficulty o f recall in 
drawing inferences from recalled content. Apparently, our sub­
jec ts  concluded that they can’t be that assertive (or unassertive) 
if  it isso  difficult to recall the requested number o f examples. In 
line with that assumption, their ratings o f ease o f recall were 
positively correlated with their self-assessment o f assertiveness 
if they had to report examples o f assertive behavior but were 
negatively correlated if they had to report examples o f unasser­
tive behavior. Most im portant, however, discrediting the experi­
enced ease o f recall by misattribution manipulations (Experi­
m ent 3) reversed the otherwise obtained pattern o f findings. In 
this case, subjects reported higher assertiveness after recalling 
12 rather than 6 examples o f  assertive behavior and lower asser­
tiveness after recalling 12 rather than 6 examples o f unassertive 
behavior.
In  summary, we conclude that people not only consider what 
they recall in making a judgment but also use the ease or diffi­
culty with which that content comes to mind as an additional 
source o f  information. Most notably, they only rely on the con­
tent of their recall if  its implications are not called into question 
by the difficulty that they experience in bringing the relevant 
material to mind. In Experiments 1 and 2, the difficulty of 
recalling 12 examples qualified the conclusions drawn from the 
content o f recall to such a degree that the obtained judgments 
were, in fact, opposite to the implications o f recalled content. 
Thus, the present studies extend previous research on the avail­
ability heuristic by drawing attention to the other end o f the 
ease-of-recall continuum: Our findings suggest that difficulty 
in recall may decrease judgments o f  frequency, probability, or 
typicality, much as ease o f recall has been assumed to increase 
these judgments.
Informative Functions o f Subjective Experiences
In addition to bearing on the operation o f the availability 
heuristic, the present studies extend previous research on the 
informative functions o f subjective experiences. This research 
has prim arily been concerned with the informational value of 
affective states (see Schwarz, 1987,1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988, 
for reviews) and has dem onstrated that people may use their 
perceived affective state as a source o f  information, according 
to a “how do I feel about it'’ heuristic (e.gn Schwarz & Clore, 
1983; Schwarz et al., 1985; Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, &
Wagner, 1987). In doing so, people (m isinterpret their pre-ex­
isting affective state as a reaction to the object o f judgm ent, 
resulting in more favorable evaluations under elated than under 
depressed moods, unless the diagnosticity o f their feelings for 
the judgment at hand is called into question. Accordingly, peo­
ple were found to rely on their feelings at the tim e o f judgm ent 
only under conditions in which they could assume those feel­
ings to reflect their affective reaction to  the object o f judgm ent.
As Clore and Parrott (in press) noted, it is informative to 
apply this logic to the operation o f  the availability heuristic. In 
principle, the availability heuristic reflects the correct insight 
that it is easier to recall frequent rather than rare events. W hat 
renders this heuristic error prone is that the experienced ease of 
retrieval may reflect the impact o f variables other than fre­
quency, such as the event’s salience o r vividness (cf. Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980). Hence, we may conclude that inappropriate appli­
cations o f the availability heuristic reflect a process o f  m isattri­
bution: People rely on their subjective experience o f  ease of 
retrieval to the extent that they (mis)attribute it to frequency o f 
occurrence, rather than to the impact o f other variables.
The same logic may be extended to other subjective experi­
ences, such as feelings o f familiarity. For example, Jacoby and 
Dallas (1981; see also Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Jacoby, Kelley, 
Brown, & Jasechko, 1989) observed in a recognition experiment 
that subjects could accurately identify rare words that had previ­
ously been shown to them but provided num erous false alarms 
in response to common words. As Clore and P arrot (in press) 
noted, subjects “apparently misattributed to  recency o f expo­
sure the sense o f familiarity that actually came from frequency 
o f exposure.”
In fact, the current analysis may be extended to the operation 
o f priming phenomena in general (cf. Clore & Parrott, in press). 
This research (see Higgins & Bargh, 1987; M artin & Clark, 
1990, for reviews) indicates that exposure to a concept increases 
the likelihood that this, rather than another, concept is subse­
quently used in interpreting ambiguous inform ation. However, 
this effect is only obtained if subjects are not aware o f  the poten­
tial impact o f the priming episode. Specifically, correlational 
analyses reported by Lombardi, Higgins, and Bargh (1987) in­
dicated that priming effects were limited to subjects who were 
not able to consciously recall the prim ed concepts. In a more 
direct experimental test, Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kilbler, and 
WBnke (1990) observed that prim ing effects were not obtained 
when subjects were subtly reminded o f the prim ing episode. 
These findings suggest that priming effects may only emerge if 
people misattribute the thoughts that come to m ind to the im­
pact o f the stimulus information. If they, correctly, attribute the 
emerging thoughts to the impact o f the prim ing procedure, on 
the other hand, priming effects seem unlikely to be obtained.
As this discussion indicates, social cognition research may 
benefit from paying closer attention to phenom enal experi­
ences, a theme that has only recently captured researchers’ at­
tention (see Bargh, 1989; Jacoby & Kelley, 1987, for reviews). 
Although the default option is probably to use the content that 
comes to mind without further qualification, judgm ental pro­
cesses may also involve the use o f subjective experiences as ah 
additional source o f data, which may qualify the implications of 
thought content. In using these data—be they affective stales, 
the ease o f retrieval, a sense o f familiarity, or an emerging train
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o f thoughts— people may pay attention to their possible causes 
to determ ine their informational value. Most important, they 
will only use these subjective experiences as a basis o f judgment 
if  they can (mis)attribute them to the impact o f the object o f 
judgment. W hereas much remains to be learned about the in­
formative functions o f  different subjective experiences, the pres­
ent discussion suggests that the general logic developed in re­
search on the informative functions o f  affective states (see Clore 
& Parrott, in press; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1988) may 
provide a fruitful heuristic framework for their conceptualiza­
tion.
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